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Agency and ontology within intersectional analysis: a critical realist contributioni  
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper will explore one of the most important and influential currents within 
contemporary feminist analysis, namely, intersectionality.  Intersectional analysis was 
developed by black women scholars who identified important absences, both political 
and theoretical, in feminist and other strands of anti-racist and critical theory (Crenshaw 
1989). The success of intersectional theory has been in its bringing together of activist 
political concerns with poststructuralist sensibilities. As Davis (2008) argues, 
intersectional theory has been remarkably successful in overcoming the apparent 
incompatibilities between these two projects: 
It takes up the political project of making the social and material 
consequences of the categories of gender/race/class visible, but does 
so by employing the methodologies compatible with the 
poststructuralist project  of deconstructing categories, unmasking 
universalism, and exploring the dynamic and contradictory workings 
of power (2008, 74).  
This is a seductive combination. Davis has argued that the ambiguities and 
contradictions within intersectional theory, rather than being a problem, are the source 
of its productivity.  In this paper, I will explore some of these contradictions and 
tensions, and suggest that while they do indeed contribute to the theory’s popularity, 
they limit its explanatory potential.  
 
Pointing to the gaps and slippages within intersectional theory is not new (Anthias, 
1998). However, I argue that we can draw on the resources offered by critical realism, 
notably, the work of Margaret Archer (1995, 1996, 2000, 2007, 2012), as a resource to 
reconceptualise what the research projects of intersectional theory might be. 
Intersectional theory is productive of numerous research questions at different levels of 
analysis but rather than celebrating, as Davis (2008) does, the blurring of distinctions 
between different projects and analytical levels, I suggest that critical realism offers a 
way of unpacking them.  The challenge faced by intersectional analysis is that 
analytical distinctions between structure and agency, and between culture and agency, 
are elided. By equivocating between experiences of oppression and the structures that 
produce them the historicity of emergence is collapsed.  
 
This is particularly the case in post-structuralist and other anti-categorical accounts in 
which, as Martinez Dy et al (2014) point out, ‘notions of positionality or structural 
discrimination are often collapsed into the concept of ‘identity’’(Martinez Dy et al 
2014, 454). Notions of identity are insufficient to the analytical task of providing 
accounts of the contextual conditions and structural components that engender (or 
inhibit) them. Along with other authors (Martinez Dy et al, 2014) I will argue that 
critical realism has much to offer. In particular, it avoids elisions between structural 
processes and the identity work of persons: in Archerian terms (1995), between 
structurally emergent properties (SEPs), culturally emergent properties (CEPs), and the 
emergent properties of people (PEPs). Critical realism challenges linguistic notions of 
identity and offers an account of ‘being human’ (Archer 2000) and of the sui generis 
powers of persons (the PEPs) not just of social structures. I will argue that such an 
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account of agency is important to sustain the normative intent of intersectional analysis 
and the political projects that underpin it.  
 
Accordingly the paper is structured in four parts: the first deals with the emergence of 
intersectional theory and its antinomies and elisions. The second introduces some of the 
key concepts from critical realism, with a specific focus on morphogenesis. The third 
involves an analysis of agency, since personal and corporate agency are central to 
understanding why intersectional theory matters. Finally, I will reprise why I think that 
critical realism is a better theoretical resource than poststructuralism, notwithstanding 
the many important insights feminist poststructuralist theorists have contributed to the 
analysis of the intersections between gender/race/ class and other markers of structural 
and cultural difference.         
 
Intersectional theory   
 
In order to make sense of the current debates about intersectionality, it is necessary to 
locate the particular historical circumstances within which the term came into usage.  
Intersectionality is not so much a unified theory as a series of concrete socio-political 
problems and situations which require analysis. It can be seen as extending the research 
programme which flowed from initial feminist interventions across the disciplines in 
the late 1960s. As Mirza  (2009) in her introduction to a special issue of Race Ethnicity 
and Education on black and postcolonial feminisms succinctly puts it: 
Women, who are collectively defined as ‘black’ or ‘Asian’ in official policy 
or practice have multiple experiences in terms of their age, sexuality, 
disability, religion or culture. Thus it is argued racism, patriarchy, social class 
and other systems of oppression simultaneously structure the relative position 
of these women at any one time creating specific and varied patterns of 
inequality and discrimination. It is the cultural and historical specificity of 
inequality that black, postcolonial and anti-racist feminists stress as important 
in developing a more holistic intersectional approach to mainstream feminist 
analysis (2009, 3). 
Presented as such, this might seem uncontroversial, but the particular circumstances in 
which intersectionality came to be seen as a necessary corrective is indicated in the 
reference in the last sentence to ‘mainstream feminist analysis’. From the early days of 
second wave feminism there had been debates about the tensions between the idea of 
‘women’ as a unified political subject, and the increasingly voiced lived realities of 
experiences of difference and other forms of oppression not simply based on gender. 
These views challenged mainstream feminist theory and gave rise to a perception that 
feminism was universalistic in its orientation, based on a false generalisation from 
white women’s experiences, which was identified as a weakness both analytical and 
political.   
 
This was never a simple story; the women’s movement was nothing if not fractious, and 
vigorous debate emerged about forms of difference based on sexuality, race, class and 
other categories of oppression and how to theorise them. The general critique was that 
1970s feminism had essentialised and generalised from middle class white women’s 
experiences  (Segal 1987, 1999). This was always problematic as the argument fails to 
distinguish between the political demands of new corporate agents (groups of women) 
agitating against particular forms of oppression, and identity as a woman. What made 
this so potent in feminism was the role of the personal (David 2003) and the practice of 
3 
 
‘consciousness raising’ as a way of going from the personal to the political. This meant 
that direct personal experience and identity were valorised in ways not found in other 
radical political projects of the left. It was not an issue in the same way, for example, in 
class politics (except in its Lukácsian formulation) since class is not assumed to be a 
unitary identity, although of course one of the criticisms many feminists made against 
class politics was that it de facto represented the interests of white, and often skilled and 
organised, men.  At its worst, the formulation of the ‘personal is political’ reduced to 
forms of bitterly fought identity politics. The charge of unconscious privilege was 
levelled at white middle class women who had undoubtedly dominated many early 
women’s groups (Rowbotham 1990). These strains have re-emerged in popular usages 
of intersectionality (Williams 2013) despite poststructuralism’s  theoretical break with 
universalism and ‘experience’.  The tensions between universalism as a strategy and the 
necessity of attention to difference reoccur over and over again. For example, in her 
book Sexual/textual politics: feminist literary theory Moi  (1985) did much to 
theoretically destabilise the category of woman while insisting on its strategic political 
importance, while more recently Gunnarsson (2011, 2015)  has defended the category 
of women and the importance of research that deals with the distinctive  powers and 
properties of gender, race, and class.  
 
The need to theorise differences between women as well as the nature of women’s 
oppression, therefore, did not begin with the coinage of the term intersectionality but 
what it did, according to Davis (2008), was give it a ‘novel twist’. As early as 1974, for 
example, the Manifesto of the Combahee River Collective began ‘As black feminists 
and lesbians who know that we have a very definite revolutionary task to perform’ and 
they went on to describe the major systems of oppression as ‘interlocking’ (Eisenstein 
1978). The term intersectionality, coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) was an attempt 
to concretely theorise these experiences and to show how they worked. What Crenshaw, 
an academic lawyer, did in articulating ‘intersectionality’ was to draw attention to the 
tendency for gender and race to be treated as separate categories, with the result that 
black women were marginalised in both feminist and anti-racist theory and politics. She 
argued that: 
Because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of 
racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality 
into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in 
which black women are subordinated (1989, 140) 
She made her case through a meticulous analysis of the ways in which black women are 
erased within antidiscrimination law. Her key example was of a law case brought 
against General Motors, alleging that the seniority system perpetuated discrimination 
against black women. Although prior to the Civil Rights Act, General Motors had not 
hired black women, it had hired white women, so the ruling argued that GM was not 
discriminating on the basis of sex. At the same time the court recommended that their 
claim be considered with another case as part of a general race discrimination claim, 
thus denying the relevance of gender. Other cases similarly denied remediation to black 
women as black women, thus, white women in effect became the default plaintiffs of 
cases of sex discrimination, while black men took priority in cases of racial 
discrimination.  
 
Crenshaw was also critical of mainstream feminist theory.  She argued that despite 
having drawn on black women’s history, most notably Sojourner Truth’s Ain’t I a 
woman? (1989, 153), white feminists had failed to take account of the needs, interests, 
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and experiences of black women when articulating their political demands and in 
theorising the position of women. Another example of this, much debated in the 1970s, 
was the theoretical attention paid to women’s relegation to the private sphere of the 
home, but these debates had little to say about black women’s history and the ways they 
were denied ‘home’. Crenshaw (1989) was similarly critical of the ways anti-racist 
politics and theory failed to address gender and the specificity of black women’s 
experiences.   
 
Since 1989, intersectionality has become a widely used term and, as Davis (2008) has 
persuasively argued, the ambiguity of the term has allowed the interests of both 
generalist and specialist feminist theoreticians to come together with those of activists.  
Yuval-Davis (2006), however, points out intersectional analysis arrived on the 
European scene from the US without much effect on policy makers. She argues, 
furthermore, that the ‘triple oppression’ approach was especially problematic as there 
‘is no such thing as suffering from oppression ‘as Black’, ‘as a woman’, ‘as a working 
class person’ (2006, 195). Rather, she and other theorists have pointed to the different 
ontological bases of each social division, irreducible and distinct from one another (see 
also Anthias 1998) It important to notice, therefore, that from the beginning, a number 
of different sorts of arguments were being adduced: about historically sedimented 
structures of multiple oppressions, about experiences and identities, about black women 
as political subjects and the ways their specific issues could be addressed in theory, how 
feminist and anti-racist theory itself failed to address the particular intersections of race, 
gender and other forms of oppression, and about the political conclusions that can be 
made from these different forms of analysis. The breadth of arguments that can be 
encompassed under the heading of intersectionality and the additive effect of different 
sorts of arguments make elision particularly problematic.  
 
These problems are compounded by what Martinez Dy et al (2014) describe as, on the 
one hand, the feminist empiricist tradition which treats race, class, and gender as 
additive effects, and on the other, the hermeneutic tradition which concentrates on 
experiences and anti-categorical notions  of identity.  As they point out both these 
traditions risk omitting ‘that which may be unexercised, unactualised, or unobserved’ 
(2014: 452) and exclude an ontology of ‘transfactuality’. Along with Martinez Dy et al  
(2014) and Gunnarsson (2015), I draw on concepts from critical realism which bring 
greater clarity to the notion of intersectional explanation, and which also allow us to 
make analytical distinctions between structure and agency in theorising 
intersectionality. I will argue that intersectional analysis is better understood not as a 
singular theory but as a research programme spanning a number of disciplines. I am not 
however presenting a unified critical realist version of intersectionality, since there is no 
unitary object to be investigated. The questions posed in the debates on intersectionality 
operate across different time periods, at different analytical levels, and are amenable to 
different normative conclusions. The analysis of historically specific intersections 
requires paying attention to structural and cultural properties as well to the operation of 
individual and collective agency. It makes no more sense, however, to reduce structural 
problems to individual experience than it does to think that experience can be deduced 
from structure, which is why I suggest that Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic approach 
has much to offer. 
 
Critical realism and morphogenetic analysis    
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Critical realism offers a series of theoretical concepts that are central to the possibility 
of doing sociological work in general, a role Bhaskar (1978) described as under-
labouring. Bhaskar (1978, 1979) provides a powerful analysis of the inadequacies of 
both idealism and positivism. In their place he argues for a depth ontology in which the 
domain of the real encompasses not only experiences (our sensory perceptions of 
things) and events (actual occurring things) but also underlying mechanisms. These, 
often non-observable, mechanisms are nonetheless real and Bhaskar argues that it is 
they that produce the world of events which we come to experience in the here and 
now. Explanation involves the identification of underlying mechanisms which operate 
transfactually in the open systems confronted in doing social science, which has 
methodological implications. Sayer (1992) in his book Method in Social Science 
provides insight into the process of retroduction: ‘a mode of inference in which events 
are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of 
producing them’ (1992, 107). In particular, he describes the process whereby we need 
to abstract from the particularities of the concrete situation and exclude those things 
which have no significant effects in order to isolate and concentrate on the things that 
do. This form of abstraction and the reconstitution of the concrete is particularly 
important, as we shall see, when confronted by increasingly extended lists of the 
numbers of possible intersections (Yuval-Davis 2006). The recognition of the need for a 
depth ontology is crucial in resolving some of the analytical and methodological 
problems which have beset research on intersectionality  (Martinez Dy et al 2014).   
 
Equally important, however, given that historicity is equally crucial for understanding 
the ways multiple structures of oppression operate is Archer’s (1995) argument about 
the historicity of emergence. Archer (1995) is the key theorist of a morphogenetic 
approach to analysing social life. This is developed in Archer’s work, grounding her 
explanatory methodology:  
The ‘morpho’ element is an acknowledgement that society has no 
pre-set form or preferred state: the ‘genetic’ part is a recognition 
that it takes its shape from, and is formed by, agents, originating 
from the intended and unintended consequences of their activities. 
(1995, 5)  
In keeping with the rejection of both idealism and positivism that underpins all critical 
realism, Archer develops a critique of their sociological manifestations in the form of 
downward, upward, and central conflations of structure and agency. Instead, she argues 
the need for analytical dualism. She is critical of both upward and downward conflation 
and also what she describes as the central conflation, of social theorists such as 
Giddens, which she argues involves an elisionist rather than an emergentist ontology 
(Archer 1995, 60-61).  Upward conflation (Archer 1995, 4) involves viewing society as 
no more than the aggregate of the behaviour of individuals, whereas downward 
conflation (Archer 1995, 3) reifies society and reduces individual action to societal 
determination.  Central conflation involves a denial of the separability of structure and 
agency since every aspect of structure is activity dependent.  She argues that 
conflationary analysis effectively confines itself to a sociology of the present in which 
structure is only evident in its present enactments. In contrast her morphogenetic 
approach is fundamentally about historicity.  Her approach is based on the necessity of 
analytically distinguishing between structure and agency and their separate emergent, 
irreducible, and autonomous causal properties. Time becomes the key to understanding 
how structural conditioning at time 1 and socio-cultural interaction at time 2 to time 3 
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results in structural elaboration (morphogenesis) or structural reproduction 
(morphostasis) at time 4.   
 
 
 
Figure1 The Morphogenetic Sequence (Archer 1995, 76) 
 
Structure  
_______________________ 
 T1 
Interaction 
________________________ 
T2    T3 
    Structural elaboration  
   ___________________________ 
          T4  
 
 
It is important to stress that the dualism is analytical rather than ontological, and that the 
key features of the model are historicity, emergence and mediation based on the real 
powers and properties of SEPs, CEPs and PEPs. Crucially, this approach allows us to 
explore restructuring over time and insists on the irreducible and continuing 
significance of agency as well as structure:  
All structural properties in any society are continuously activity 
dependent.  Nevertheless, it is possible to separate ‘structure’ and 
‘agency’ through analytical dualism and to examine their interplay in 
order to account for the structuring and restructuring of the social 
order. Fundamentally, this is possible for two reasons. Firstly 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’ are different kinds of emergent properties…. 
Secondly, and fundamental to the workability of this explanatory 
methodology, ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ operate diachronically over 
different tracts of time because: (i) structure necessarily pre-dates the 
action(s) that transform it and (ii) structural elaboration necessarily 
post-dates those actions .. (2012, 52)       
This is key if we are to make sense of the structuring at time 1 which confronts black 
women (and other actors) with conditions not of their own choosing and upon which 
they reflexively act. It is clear from studies that the structuring conditions at time 1 are 
multiple and, moreover, if we are thinking in terms of both race and gender, that some 
areas are deeply resistant to change. We can identify a long durée in terms of 
reproduction with periods of morphostasis in relation to gender relations of power for 
example. The outcome is not preordained but our explanations as to why the outcome is 
change rather than stasis depend on looking at the structuring conditions and at 
individual and collective, or what Archer (2000) calls corporate, agency.  
 
Archer (1996) not only takes into account structural properties and emergence, but also 
takes culture seriously, introducing an analytically important distinction between 
Cultural System and the Socio-Cultural. The Cultural System refers to the existing 
intelligiblia: the ideas that can be expressed at any one time (whether these are actually 
expressed or not). The logical relations between these elements within the system can 
be analysed through the formal features of the system namely those of contradiction, 
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change, mutual reinforcement (complementarities), and reproduction. The Socio-
Cultural refers to how ideas map onto relationships between people – in other words, 
how ideas are taken up and mobilised. To simply reduce the former to the latter would 
be a form of epistemic fallacy since it reduces culture to our understanding of it. Socio-
Cultural elaboration at time 2-3 at the cultural level involves paying attention to both 
the System and the Socio-Cultural, which again can result in either morphogensis or 
morphostasis.   
 
Analytical dualism offers a valuable resource for thinking about intersections because it 
prises open the connections between structure and agency, and thus opens them up for 
explanatory accounts. Conflationary analysis is especially problematic in intersectional 
theorising where structures of oppression are seen as instantiated in the doing of race 
and gender and other forms of oppression. For example, West and Fenstermaker (1995) 
make valuable criticisms of mathematical metaphors in feminist theory, of which of 
course the intersection is one.  Their solution, however, is to propose an 
ethnomethodological approach in which ‘the ‘objective’ and ‘factual’ properties of 
social life attain such status through the situated conduct of societal members’ (1995, 
19). Effectively, different forms of oppression are analysed simultaneously by looking 
at how they are achieved through the ongoing activity of actors in the present. This is a 
form of central conflation, since neither structure not agency can be thought of 
independently of one another. What we have instead is continuous reproduction in 
present time. The historicity of emergence is lost in this account, and with it, the 
potential for explanatory analysis since structure is dissolved into repeated contextual 
enactments.   
 
This lack of analytical distinction also presents major problems for sustaining 
analytically useful categories such as women, since of course ‘woman’ is never 
instantiated in isolation from other social properties; hence, the charge of essentialism 
against early feminists who the used the term ‘women/woman’ in their accounts of 
women’s oppression.  However, in a carefully argued critical realist account 
Gunnarsson (2011)  defends the category of women pointing out that the starting point 
of feminist theory is to show how women are oppressed and exploited ‘by virtue of the 
fact of their being women’ (2011, 24).  Drawing on the work of Sayer (1992) she argues 
that abstract categories such as gender, race and class are essential for theorisation of 
structures of oppression that do not reduce to the level of the lived reality of individuals. 
When we use the term women we are referring to an abstraction as part of an 
explanatory account and crucially: 
critical realists apply a ‘causal criterion’ for ascribing a distinct reality to 
something …. If something has an impact on the world that is irreducible 
to the causal effects of other entities we can talk of it as a distinct reality,  
even though its reality is wholly premised on its relationship with other 
things (2015, 5). 
The critical realist account of explanation and the morphogenetic approach allow us to 
address the issue of separate but entangled processes in a way that does not lead to 
central conflation. This ability to hold structure and agency analytically separate is 
essential to address the multiple forms of oppression and exploitation that Crenshaw 
identified, since at the level of lived experience the concrete realities of race, class and 
gender co-exist, but we need to be able to separate structure and agency to account for 
statis and change over time.   
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Social theory needs to wrestle with understanding the multiple determinations of the 
concrete by employing necessary abstraction and accounting for the unseen. For this 
reason, critical realists utilise unifying non-deterministic categories as well as recognise 
the reality of mechanisms, not just events. In addition, the significance of historicity 
would be common ground for many intersectional theorists, although not necessarily 
under the terms considered above. Before further considering the potential explanatory 
power of morphogenetic analysis, however, I want to introduce Archer’s concept of 
agency, since this is highly distinctive and marks a break with poststructuralist theories 
of identity on which much intersectional analysis rests (Davis 2008).   
 
Agency  
 
Central to Archer’s (2000) theory of agency is the assertion of the primacy of practice 
rather than language, and her insistence that people have sui generis properties and 
powers which are not reducible to either those of structure or culture.  In doing so she 
breaks with the disembodied subject of ‘modernity’s man’: 
The metaphysics of modernity thus adduced a model of instrumentally 
rational man who could attain his ends in the world by pure logos, a 
rationality working through the formal manipulation of linguistic 
symbols to generate truth (2000, 23). 
Instead, in her book Being Human: the problem of agency, she elaborates a theory of the 
potentiality of active human agents whose properties and powers are emergent from our 
relations with the environment and with relative autonomy from both society and 
biology:  
The properties and powers of the human being are neither seen as 
pregiven, nor as socially appropriated, but rather these are emergent 
from our relations with our environment. As such they have relative 
autonomy from biology and society alike, and causal powers to 
modify both of them (2000, 87). 
 
By insisting on the importance of the embodied human being and the primacy of 
practice – Marx’s ‘continuous practical activity in a material world’ (2000, 122) – and 
as a species being with natural potentials, she develops a theory of the conditions for the 
emergence of the self in its necessary relations with the environment. In doing so she 
distinguishes between concepts of the self which are necessarily social, and a sense of 
the self which is not.  So that while there are discursively produced subjectivities, there 
is also an embodied sense of self continuous through the history of a particular life.  She 
argues that a coherent account of the development of agents and social actors needs to 
be grounded in this non-discursively formed continuous sense of self. This is a decisive 
break with the linguistic dominance found poststructuralist theorising and acts to ground 
her account of what it means to act in the world.  
 
Archer’s model of personal and social identity is one in which individual and collective 
agents have the resources to act creatively in the world, thus creating conditions for 
transformation and change as well as social stasis. She theorises the ways in which 
people come to be able to act reflexively through her notion of the ‘internal 
conversation’ which is essential to how humans come to make (always fallible) 
judgements about the conditions in which they find themselves and deliberate about 
possible courses of action. She argues that human beings are fundamentally evaluative 
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in their relations with reality, and that the ‘inner conversation’ is critical in 
understanding how human beings come to make commitments:   
The ‘inner conversation’ is how our personal emergent powers are 
exercised on and in the world – natural, practical and social – which 
is our triune environment. This ‘interior dialogue’ is not just a 
window on the world, rather it is what determines our being in the 
world, though not in times and circumstances of our choosing. 
Fundamentally, the ‘inner conversation’ is constitutive of our 
concrete singularity. However, it is also and necessarily a 
conversation about reality. This is because the triune world sets us 
three problems, none of which can be evaded, made as we are. It 
confronts us with three inescapable concerns: with our physical well-
being, our performative competence and our self worth (2003, 318).  
 
In keeping with her morphogenetic approach she elaborates how the ‘me’ in the present 
– ‘the conditioning me’ at time 1 – becomes at time 2 the conversational ‘I’, whereby 
possible future projects are reviewed for the ‘you’ at time 3. The ‘I’ reflexively 
monitors its ultimate concerns. Human beings in this account are strong evaluators with 
a range of personal powers who confront their triune environment and who perforce 
possess embodied knowledge, practical knowledge, and discursive knowledge.  
Reflexivity and the internal conversation are the means by which human beings can 
come to commit to their central concerns. Not all forms of reflexivity are the same and 
based on her empirical work she distinguishes between communicative, autonomous, 
meta, and fractured reflexivity (although historically and cross-culturally there may be 
more). Her work identifies ‘communicative reflexives’ who remain anchored in the 
natal social context of their birth families; ‘autonomous reflexives’ who adopt strategic 
stances towards constraints and become upwardly socially mobile; ‘meta-reflexives’ 
who are ‘contextually incongruous’ and ‘subversive towards social constraints and 
enablements, because of their willingness to pay the price of the former and to forfeit 
the benefits of the latter in the attempt to live out their idea’ ; and ‘fractured reflexivity’ 
where people are unable to form and act on their central projects or cares. Her view of 
humans includes an elaboration of the importance of both first and second order 
emotion. It is a misapprehension on the part of some feminists, for example, in Nelson’s 
(2003) contribution to a protracted debate about the value of critical realism for feminist 
economics, that critical realism excludes such matters (XXXX 2013).  
 
It is by virtue of these powers that humans come to reflexively define their central 
commitments through the internal conversation, which crucially forms the basis for 
corporate agency: 
Organised interest groups represent the generation of a new 
emergent property amongst people (a PEP), whose power is the very 
special punch they pack as far as systemic stability and change are 
concerned. Only those who are aware of what they want, can 
articulate it to themselves and others, and have organised in order to 
obtain it, can engage in concerted action to reshape or retain the 
structural and /or cultural features in question. These are termed 
‘Corporate Agents’: they include self-conscious vested interest 
groups, promotive interest groups, social movements and defensive 
associations (2000, 265) 
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I have argued elsewhere that Archer’s concepts give us a powerful basis for theorising 
agency in feminism and for breaking both with the unified subject of modernity and the 
poststructuralist problematic of dissolving the political subject of feminism (XXXX 
2006). While poststructuralist analysis has successfully documented aspects of unfixity 
and fragmentation in terms of social identity, it lacks the theoretical resource to explain 
the powerful sense of self which it ends up negating. This is because, despite the 
seeming openness in poststructuralism at the level of ontology offered by the and/and 
formulation, rather than either /or (Davies 1997, 2004) poststructuralism’s fundamental 
ontological claim involves the primacy of the discursive and denial of a pre-discursive 
self.  With these distinctions in mind, it is now possible to return to the central theme of 
this paper, namely, critical realism as a resource for theorising the multiple intersections 
to which intersectionality refers.   
  
Intersectional theory and critical realism  
 
I have argued elsewhere (XXXX 2006, 2012) that there is often much commonality at 
the level of concrete analysis between theorists from different traditions. While there is 
overlap in terms of substantive analysis, critical realism rejects the Nietzschean legacy 
of poststructuralism and the idea that that the individual subject is a fiction, that the will 
to power is constitutive of identity and reality, and that science itself has no special 
epistemological significance. Poststructuralism has offered intersectional theorists many 
useful methodological tools, but these are not the preserve of poststructural analysis. 
Attention to the significance of the discursive is not unique to poststructuralism and 
critical realism pays attention both to the discursive and the critical deconstruction of 
categories. In taking issue with specific pieces of research, it is often the ontological 
status of the claims being made that are being challenged and not the specific empirical 
arguments or the data presented.   
 
Intersectional theory, as we have seen, resonated powerfully because the substantive 
situations its analysis sought to address are of immense importance for sociological 
theory, and it seemed to successfully align competing strands of feminist theory. 
However, as indicated, the danger in intersectional analysis is that analytical 
distinctions between structure and agency, and between culture and agency, are elided; 
additionally, in simultaneously talking about both the experiences and the structures of 
oppression, the historicity of emergence is collapsed. This is particularly problematic 
where positions are argued which appear to be about structural and cultural forms of 
inequality (in critical realist terms: the operation of the SEPs and CEPs at time 1) but 
which are then reduced to the question of multiple identities. Yuval-Davis  (2006) gives  
a particularly apposite example of this kind of reasoning in the report of  the Working  
Group on Women and Human Rights where she shows how the report begins with 
structural concerns which ‘structure the relative positions of women, races, ethnicities, 
classes and the like’ (2006, 197) but is transmuted into a concern with specific 
identities. This slippage allows no space in which to consider how actors engage with 
structural conditions over time, reflexively engaging with the structural conditions at 
time 1 in order to commit to projects which may or may not result in morphogenesis. In 
this instance, the example is policy, in which the ability of people to come to 
evaluations and act upon their concerns is central. Therefore, the elaboration of 
particular identities may or may not have salience in the formation of particular social 
movements or alliances (or in Archerian terms, the exercise of corporate agency).   
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Thinking about historically sedimented structures of multiple oppressions presents a 
series of contexts which are suited to morphogenetic analysis at both the cultural and 
social level. A critical realist reading of Crenshaw’s GM example could be that 
constraints in the ideational cultural system at time one, implied by the legal separation 
of ‘race’ and ‘gender’, are elaborated and challenged at the socio-cultural level at time 
two as actors challenge this separation  by insisting on the specificity of their 
oppression  as ‘black women’ through attempts to seek remediation in court. Crenshaw 
identifies black women as previously unrecognised corporate actors; as such the ways 
their activities have led to changes in law and other institutions over time is clearly 
important. Equally important are questions regarding what has not changed, and the 
nature of structural constraints. The issue is not the elaboration of intersectional theory 
as a unitary set of propositions but of the specification of clear problems which can be 
analysed in ways which show how particular intersections operate over time. Historicity 
is, therefore, key to the argument.  
 
The challenge for critical realist analysis is to bring the analytical lens which it affords 
to existing work on intersectionality, with the aim of clarifying what the claims might 
be, and also to mobilise critical realism as a resource for nascent research projects that 
explore specific instances of how intersections are operating. From a critical realist 
perspective, there is an important role for research which looks at the operation of 
specific mechanisms in particular geohistorical locations: 
As long as we are clear that an analysis of for instance gender on its own 
terms relies on an abstraction of some processual parts from an infinitely 
complex social whole …, it is desirable that some theorists engage in 
‘separatist’ theoretical explorations of what precisely this ‘gender’ (or 
‘race’, ‘class’ ‘sexuality’) is, in certain geohistorical locations.  
Otherwise there is a risk that we reproduce unreflected notions of their 
ontologies (Gunnarsson 2015, 10) 
In other words, not all analysis undertaken form a critical realist perspective will be of  
intersections but the philosophical clarity underpinning the work will mean that the 
work is capable of contributing to the wider research programme. The work of  
identifying particular mechanisms is grounded in a general philosophical model of 
explanation in the social sciences, based on the twin ideas of ‘retroduction’ and 
‘retrodiction’ (Bhaskar 1986, 68).  Theoretical explanation is retroductive and involves 
identifying and analysing the causal powers, underlying mechanisms, and the entities 
that possess them. Retrodiction involves the analysis of concrete phenomena through 
the analysis of the multiple causal forces operating in the messy open systems of the 
social world.  Retrodiction is of particular significance for intersectional analysis 
because, as Mirza (2009) indicates, this involves charting how different forms of 
oppression create ‘specific and varied patterns of inequality’ (2009, 3), thereby using 
abstraction and knowledge of multiple mechanisms to reconstitute the concrete.  
 
As Davis
 
(2008) points out, the political aims influenced by the idea of multiple 
oppressions and poststructuralism appeared to share the common goal of deconstructing 
the unified concept of woman. But poststructuralism, at its extreme, deconstructs all 
sorts of difference including those which gave rise to the need to theorise 
intersectionality in the first place. The danger is that the structures and experiences 
referred to by Crenshaw and Mirza are reduced to the merely discursive and to the 
fluidity of unfixed identities. However, this presents particular problems for sustaining 
the idea of agency in the critical realist sense, which is necessary in order to understand 
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and theorise the collective mobilisation involved in political projects. This problem is 
produced within poststructuralism by a deconstruction of the subject such that agency 
and voice are reduced to subjectification, the on-going process of producing a ‘self’ 
which lacks ontological status.  
 
This is illustrated in the arguments of Davies (1997, 2004), where, following Foucault, 
she describes the unfixity of the subject as the ongoing process of the constitution of the 
‘self’. While she defines the subject as fictional (note the scare quotes around ‘self’), 
she nonetheless recognises the power of these fictions as central to the feminist project 
of bringing about change. So the central contradiction Davis (2008) identifies with 
movement activists is glossed over into a feminist subject discursively brought into 
being. What is important to note from a critical realist perspective is that, in this 
account, the powers accorded to PEPs disappear from view as a subject to be analysed 
at the empirical and philosophical level, while distinctions between epistemic and 
judgemental relativism are simply collapsed. 
 
In order to meaningfully address issues of identity, we need a proper theory of persons. 
This is central to the task of analysing experiences and identities from a critical realist 
perspective.  This would allow us to tease out people’s concerns in their relations with 
the natural, practical and social order, to consider how the causal powers of human 
beings come to be exercised, and how as strong evaluators people come to understand 
the salience of race and gender, for example, as key aspects (or not) of their personal 
and in some circumstances political identity.  This is not a simple or singular exercise 
and involves understanding how people come to deliberate on their circumstances and 
reflexively identify themselves (or not) as, say, a black woman. In relation to the 
emergence of new political subjects, critical realism would suggest that it is within the 
context of people’s emergent powers and the possibilities that the development of 
corporate agency can be understood.  
 
Furthermore, an analysis of social movements and the conditions under which they 
flourish is essential. In the exchange between Harding (1999, 2003) from a standpoint 
theorist perspective, and Lawson (1999, 2002), from a critical realist perspective, 
Harding makes important arguments about why powerful insights are produced by 
differently positioned groups of actors. Harding’s account of why feminists historically 
chose to struggle on the epistemological front is one such explanatory account, but that 
does not foreclose the ontological argument about the stratified nature of reality as 
emphasised by Lawson. In some of the writing on intersectionality corporate agency 
has been strategically deployed not to argue the case for sectional interests (specifically 
the interests of black women or women of colour) but to extend the case to developing a 
more universal set of claims about social justice. Hill Collins (2004) in her book Black 
Sexual Politics argues that she is dealing with a local manifestation of more general 
global phenomena and extends the commitment to social justice to all human beings. So 
the sorts of corporate agents she imagines are defined not only in terms of their personal 
characteristics, but by virtue of their values and commitments to social justice.  
 
These commitments are best analysed within a view of social science which is alive to 
human values and flourishing.  Concerns with social justice constitute a key element of 
critical realist thinking.  An important part of critical realism’s Bhaskarian legacy is the 
connection between critical realism and concerns with human emancipation (Bhaskar 
1986). He argued that if we can identify the underlying mechanisms which are 
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producing injustice or suffering, then we can show under what conditions it could be 
otherwise. In these circumstances, the argument becomes that ceritus paribis (other 
things being equal) we should change it. Sayer in his book Why Things Matter to 
People (2011) deconstructs and shows the inadequacy of the fact-value separation 
which has plagued much philosophy and social scientific thinking. This separation is 
closely related to the historically gendered separation between reason and emotion 
(XXXX 2013) and the denial of a relation between two. This dichotomisation and its 
detrimental consequences have been the target of much feminist scholarship (eg Boler 
1999) and Archer (2000) has argued that emotions are important for the personal 
commitments people make to the things that matter to them and are thus central in 
understanding human agency.  Sayer’s (2011) naturalistic grounding of claims about 
the conditions for human flourishing are important for the broader political projects 
articulated by Hill-Collins (2004) and others. They are not the only theorists to do so; 
critical realists share much common ground with other sorts of critical theory. 
Normative reasoning and conclusions are central to any political praxis as is the power 
of deconstruction, and I am not arguing that critical realists have the only claim to these 
traditions.  In Bodies That Matter Judith Butler, for example, argues that:    
To call a presupposition into question is not the same as doing away with 
it; rather, it is to free it from its metaphysical lodgings in order to 
understand what political interests were secured in and by that 
metaphysical placing, and thereby to permit the term to occupy and to 
serve very different political aims (1993, 30). 
Although she eschews an explanatory account of how these metaphysical lodgings came 
to exercise their hold, the emancipatory logic is clear. I am claiming, however, that 
radical politics, and this includes the motivating force behind all intersectional theory, is 
better served by analyses which can impute agency to actors. The tensions between 
poststructuralist accounts of selfhood as subjectification (Davies 1997, 2004)  and the 
aspirations of activists for a better world cannot be simply reduced to the charge of 
essentialism against the early women’s movement (although there are examples of this 
in speech and writing designed to mobilise). Nor is it to deny that many analyses of 
particular situations were inadequate because they failed to take account of the 
complexity of the ways structural features of race, class and other oppressions operate. 
Explanatory analysis is difficult and always incomplete. However, substantive analyses 
would be better if not hobbled by inadequate accounts of structure and agency, and the 
flat ontologies of both poststructuralism and empiricism.  
 
This is why a morphogenetic account is important: it neither reduces society to 
individual experience, nor experience to society. Furthermore, and most importantly, it 
does not conflate the two in an endless and amorphous present. Rather, it offers the 
analytical tools to analyse the historicity of emergence. All this means nothing, 
however, if our theory of persons is too thin to account for first, our capacity to act in 
the world and second, our reasons as strong evaluators, powered by first and second 
order emotions and reflexivity, for doing so (Archer 2000). Of course there are 
differences between critical realists in relation, for example, to the relative importance 
of habitual action and reflexivity and how to theorise these. No theory is or can be 
complete, but because I am not a judgemental relativist I think some theories are better 
than others. Critical realism both acts as an under-labourer for science and, as we have 
seem in Archer’s case, offers substantive propositions about the nature of the internal 
conversation and situated reflexivity.  It brings both of these benefits to the analysis of 
intersectionality, enhancing the possibilities for its research programme. A philosophical 
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approach which cannot adequately theorize human agency and the possibilities for 
corporate agency seems inadequate to the task of both analysis and politics.  By 
articulating agency and exploring historical emergence and the morphogenetic cycle, 
this work can ground radical normative aims. While Davis’s (2008) argument about the 
productivity of intersectionality as a research programme is sociologically insightful, a 
research programme underpinned by a philosophy that clearly explicates its relation to 
human practice has even more potential.  
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Agency and ontology within intersectional analysis: a critical realist contributioni  
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper will explore one of the most important and influential currents within 
contemporary feminist analysis, namely, intersectionality.  Intersectional analysis was 
developed by black women scholars who identified important absences, both political 
and theoretical, in feminist and other strands of anti-racist and critical theory (Crenshaw 
1989). The success of intersectional theory has been in its bringing together of activist 
political concerns with poststructuralist sensibilities. As Davis (2008) argues, 
intersectional theory has been remarkably successful in overcoming the apparent 
incompatibilities between these two projects: 
It takes up the political project of making the social and material 
consequences of the categories of gender/race/class visible, but does 
so by employing the methodologies compatible with the 
poststructuralist project  of deconstructing categories, unmasking 
universalism, and exploring the dynamic and contradictory workings 
of power (2008, 74).  
This is a seductive combination. Davis has argued that the ambiguities and 
contradictions within intersectional theory, rather than being a problem, are the source 
of its productivity.  In this paper, I will explore some of these contradictions and 
tensions, and suggest that while they do indeed contribute to the theory’s popularity, 
they limit its explanatory potential.  
 
Pointing to the gaps and slippages within intersectional theory is not new (Anthias, 
1998). However, I argue that we can draw on the resources offered by critical realism, 
notably, the work of Margaret Archer (1995, 1996, 2000, 2007, 2012), as a resource to 
reconceptualise what the research projects of intersectional theory might be. 
Intersectional theory is productive of numerous research questions at different levels of 
analysis but rather than celebrating, as Davis (2008) does, the blurring of distinctions 
between different projects and analytical levels, I suggest that critical realism offers a 
way of unpacking them.  The challenge faced by intersectional analysis is that 
analytical distinctions between structure and agency, and between culture and agency, 
are elided. By equivocating between experiences of oppression and the structures that 
produce them the historicity of emergence is collapsed.  
 
This is particularly the case in post-structuralist and other anti-categorical accounts in 
which, as Martinez Dy et al (2014) point out, ‘notions of positionality or structural 
discrimination are often collapsed into the concept of ‘identity’’(Martinez Dy et al 
2014, 454). Notions of identity are insufficient to the analytical task of providing 
accounts of the contextual conditions and structural components that engender (or 
inhibit) them. Along with other authors (Martinez Dy et al, 2014) I will argue that 
critical realism has much to offer. In particular, it avoids elisions between structural 
processes and the identity work of persons: in Archerian terms (1995), between 
structurally emergent properties (SEPs), culturally emergent properties (CEPs), and the 
emergent properties of people (PEPs). Critical realism challenges linguistic notions of 
identity and offers an account of ‘being human’ (Archer 2000) and of the sui generis 
powers of persons (the PEPs) not just of social structures. I will argue that such an 
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account of agency is important to sustain the normative intent of intersectional analysis 
and the political projects that underpin it.  
 
Accordingly the paper is structured in four parts: the first deals with the emergence of 
intersectional theory and its antinomies and elisions. The second introduces some of the 
key concepts from critical realism, with a specific focus on morphogenesis. The third 
involves an analysis of agency, since personal and corporate agency are central to 
understanding why intersectional theory matters. Finally, I will reprise why I think that 
critical realism is a better theoretical resource than poststructuralism, notwithstanding 
the many important insights feminist poststructuralist theorists have contributed to the 
analysis of the intersections between gender/race/ class and other markers of structural 
and cultural difference.         
 
Intersectional theory   
 
In order to make sense of the current debates about intersectionality, it is necessary to 
locate the particular historical circumstances within which the term came into usage.  
Intersectionality is not so much a unified theory as a series of concrete socio-political 
problems and situations which require analysis. It can be seen as extending the research 
programme which flowed from initial feminist interventions across the disciplines in 
the late 1960s. As Mirza  (2009) in her introduction to a special issue of Race Ethnicity 
and Education on black and postcolonial feminisms succinctly puts it: 
Women, who are collectively defined as ‘black’ or ‘Asian’ in official policy 
or practice have multiple experiences in terms of their age, sexuality, 
disability, religion or culture. Thus it is argued racism, patriarchy, social class 
and other systems of oppression simultaneously structure the relative position 
of these women at any one time creating specific and varied patterns of 
inequality and discrimination. It is the cultural and historical specificity of 
inequality that black, postcolonial and anti-racist feminists stress as important 
in developing a more holistic intersectional approach to mainstream feminist 
analysis (2009, 3). 
Presented as such, this might seem uncontroversial, but the particular circumstances in 
which intersectionality came to be seen as a necessary corrective is indicated in the 
reference in the last sentence to ‘mainstream feminist analysis’. From the early days of 
second wave feminism there had been debates about the tensions between the idea of 
‘women’ as a unified political subject, and the increasingly voiced lived realities of 
experiences of difference and other forms of oppression not simply based on gender. 
These views challenged mainstream feminist theory and gave rise to a perception that 
feminism was universalistic in its orientation, based on a false generalisation from 
white women’s experiences, which was identified as a weakness both analytical and 
political.   
 
This was never a simple story; the women’s movement was nothing if not fractious, and 
vigorous debate emerged about forms of difference based on sexuality, race, class and 
other categories of oppression and how to theorise them. The general critique was that 
1970s feminism had essentialised and generalised from middle class white women’s 
experiences  (Segal 1987, 1999). This was always problematic as the argument fails to 
distinguish between the political demands of new corporate agents (groups of women) 
agitating against particular forms of oppression, and identity as a woman. What made 
this so potent in feminism was the role of the personal (David 2003) and the practice of 
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‘consciousness raising’ as a way of going from the personal to the political. This meant 
that direct personal experience and identity were valorised in ways not found in other 
radical political projects of the left. It was not an issue in the same way, for example, in 
class politics (except in its Lukácsian formulation) since class is not assumed to be a 
unitary identity, although of course one of the criticisms many feminists made against 
class politics was that it de facto represented the interests of white, and often skilled and 
organised, men.  At its worst, the formulation of the ‘personal is political’ reduced to 
forms of bitterly fought identity politics. The charge of unconscious privilege was 
levelled at white middle class women who had undoubtedly dominated many early 
women’s groups (Rowbotham 1990). These strains have re-emerged in popular usages 
of intersectionality (Williams 2013) despite poststructuralism’s  theoretical break with 
universalism and ‘experience’.  The tensions between universalism as a strategy and the 
necessity of attention to difference reoccur over and over again. For example, in her 
book Sexual/textual politics: feminist literary theory Moi  (1985) did much to 
theoretically destabilise the category of woman while insisting on its strategic political 
importance, while more recently Gunnarsson (2011, 2015)  has defended the category 
of women and the importance of research that deals with the distinctive  powers and 
properties of gender, race, and class.  
 
The need to theorise differences between women as well as the nature of women’s 
oppression, therefore, did not begin with the coinage of the term intersectionality but 
what it did, according to Davis (2008), was give it a ‘novel twist’. As early as 1974, for 
example, the Manifesto of the Combahee River Collective began ‘As black feminists 
and lesbians who know that we have a very definite revolutionary task to perform’ and 
they went on to describe the major systems of oppression as ‘interlocking’ (Eisenstein 
1978). The term intersectionality, coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) was an attempt 
to concretely theorise these experiences and to show how they worked. What Crenshaw, 
an academic lawyer, did in articulating ‘intersectionality’ was to draw attention to the 
tendency for gender and race to be treated as separate categories, with the result that 
black women were marginalised in both feminist and anti-racist theory and politics. She 
argued that: 
Because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of 
racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality 
into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in 
which black women are subordinated (1989, 140) 
She made her case through a meticulous analysis of the ways in which black women are 
erased within antidiscrimination law. Her key example was of a law case brought 
against General Motors, alleging that the seniority system perpetuated discrimination 
against black women. Although prior to the Civil Rights Act, General Motors had not 
hired black women, it had hired white women, so the ruling argued that GM was not 
discriminating on the basis of sex. At the same time the court recommended that their 
claim be considered with another case as part of a general race discrimination claim, 
thus denying the relevance of gender. Other cases similarly denied remediation to black 
women as black women, thus, white women in effect became the default plaintiffs of 
cases of sex discrimination, while black men took priority in cases of racial 
discrimination.  
 
Crenshaw was also critical of mainstream feminist theory.  She argued that despite 
having drawn on black women’s history, most notably Sojourner Truth’s Ain’t I a 
woman? (1989, 153), white feminists had failed to take account of the needs, interests, 
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and experiences of black women when articulating their political demands and in 
theorising the position of women. Another example of this, much debated in the 1970s, 
was the theoretical attention paid to women’s relegation to the private sphere of the 
home, but these debates had little to say about black women’s history and the ways they 
were denied ‘home’. Crenshaw (1989) was similarly critical of the ways anti-racist 
politics and theory failed to address gender and the specificity of black women’s 
experiences.   
 
Since 1989, intersectionality has become a widely used term and, as Davis (2008) has 
persuasively argued, the ambiguity of the term has allowed the interests of both 
generalist and specialist feminist theoreticians to come together with those of activists.  
Yuval-Davis (2006), however, points out intersectional analysis arrived on the 
European scene from the US without much effect on policy makers. She argues, 
furthermore, that the ‘triple oppression’ approach was especially problematic as there 
‘is no such thing as suffering from oppression ‘as Black’, ‘as a woman’, ‘as a working 
class person’ (2006, 195). Rather, she and other theorists have pointed to the different 
ontological bases of each social division, irreducible and distinct from one another (see 
also Anthias 1998) It important to notice, therefore, that from the beginning, a number 
of different sorts of arguments were being adduced: about historically sedimented 
structures of multiple oppressions, about experiences and identities, about black women 
as political subjects and the ways their specific issues could be addressed in theory, how 
feminist and anti-racist theory itself failed to address the particular intersections of race, 
gender and other forms of oppression, and about the political conclusions that can be 
made from these different forms of analysis. The breadth of arguments that can be 
encompassed under the heading of intersectionality and the additive effect of different 
sorts of arguments make elision particularly problematic.  
 
These problems are compounded by what Martinez Dy et al (2014) describe as, on the 
one hand, the feminist empiricist tradition which treats race, class, and gender as 
additive effects, and on the other, the hermeneutic tradition which concentrates on 
experiences and anti-categorical notions  of identity.  As they point out both these 
traditions risk omitting ‘that which may be unexercised, unactualised, or unobserved’ 
(2014: 452) and exclude an ontology of ‘transfactuality’. Along with Martinez Dy et al  
(2014) and Gunnarsson (2015), I draw on concepts from critical realism which bring 
greater clarity to the notion of intersectional explanation, and which also allow us to 
make analytical distinctions between structure and agency in theorising 
intersectionality. I will argue that intersectional analysis is better understood not as a 
singular theory but as a research programme spanning a number of disciplines. I am not 
however presenting a unified critical realist version of intersectionality, since there is no 
unitary object to be investigated. The questions posed in the debates on intersectionality 
operate across different time periods, at different analytical levels, and are amenable to 
different normative conclusions. The analysis of historically specific intersections 
requires paying attention to structural and cultural properties as well to the operation of 
individual and collective agency. It makes no more sense, however, to reduce structural 
problems to individual experience than it does to think that experience can be deduced 
from structure, which is why I suggest that Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic approach 
has much to offer. 
 
Critical realism and morphogenetic analysis    
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Critical realism offers a series of theoretical concepts that are central to the possibility 
of doing sociological work in general, a role Bhaskar (1978) described as under-
labouring. Bhaskar (1978, 1979) provides a powerful analysis of the inadequacies of 
both idealism and positivism. In their place he argues for a depth ontology in which the 
domain of the real encompasses not only experiences (our sensory perceptions of 
things) and events (actual occurring things) but also underlying mechanisms. These, 
often non-observable, mechanisms are nonetheless real and Bhaskar argues that it is 
they that produce the world of events which we come to experience in the here and 
now. Explanation involves the identification of underlying mechanisms which operate 
transfactually in the open systems confronted in doing social science, which has 
methodological implications. Sayer (1992) in his book Method in Social Science 
provides insight into the process of retroduction: ‘a mode of inference in which events 
are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of 
producing them’ (1992, 107). In particular, he describes the process whereby we need 
to abstract from the particularities of the concrete situation and exclude those things 
which have no significant effects in order to isolate and concentrate on the things that 
do. This form of abstraction and the reconstitution of the concrete is particularly 
important, as we shall see, when confronted by increasingly extended lists of the 
numbers of possible intersections (Yuval-Davis 2006). The recognition of the need for a 
depth ontology is crucial in resolving some of the analytical and methodological 
problems which have beset research on intersectionality  (Martinez Dy et al 2014).   
 
Equally important, however, given that historicity is equally crucial for understanding 
the ways multiple structures of oppression operate is Archer’s (1995) argument about 
the historicity of emergence. Archer (1995) is the key theorist of a morphogenetic 
approach to analysing social life. This is developed in Archer’s work, grounding her 
explanatory methodology:  
The ‘morpho’ element is an acknowledgement that society has no 
pre-set form or preferred state: the ‘genetic’ part is a recognition 
that it takes its shape from, and is formed by, agents, originating 
from the intended and unintended consequences of their activities. 
(1995, 5)  
In keeping with the rejection of both idealism and positivism that underpins all critical 
realism, Archer develops a critique of their sociological manifestations in the form of 
downward, upward, and central conflations of structure and agency. Instead, she argues 
the need for analytical dualism. She is critical of both upward and downward conflation 
and also what she describes as the central conflation, of social theorists such as 
Giddens, which she argues involves an elisionist rather than an emergentist ontology 
(Archer 1995, 60-61).  Upward conflation (Archer 1995, 4) involves viewing society as 
no more than the aggregate of the behaviour of individuals, whereas downward 
conflation (Archer 1995, 3) reifies society and reduces individual action to societal 
determination.  Central conflation involves a denial of the separability of structure and 
agency since every aspect of structure is activity dependent.  She argues that 
conflationary analysis effectively confines itself to a sociology of the present in which 
structure is only evident in its present enactments. In contrast her morphogenetic 
approach is fundamentally about historicity.  Her approach is based on the necessity of 
analytically distinguishing between structure and agency and their separate emergent, 
irreducible, and autonomous causal properties. Time becomes the key to understanding 
how structural conditioning at time 1 and socio-cultural interaction at time 2 to time 3 
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results in structural elaboration (morphogenesis) or structural reproduction 
(morphostasis) at time 4.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1 The Morphogenetic Sequence (Archer 1995, 76) 
 
Structure  
_______________________ 
 T1 
Interaction 
________________________ 
T2    T3 
    Structural elaboration  
   ___________________________ 
          T4  
 
 
It is important to stress that the dualism is analytical rather than ontological, and that the 
key features of the model are historicity, emergence and mediation based on the real 
powers and properties of SEPs, CEPs and PEPs. Crucially, this approach allows us to 
explore restructuring over time and insists on the irreducible and continuing 
significance of agency as well as structure:  
All structural properties in any society are continuously activity 
dependent.  Nevertheless, it is possible to separate ‘structure’ and 
‘agency’ through analytical dualism and to examine their interplay in 
order to account for the structuring and restructuring of the social 
order. Fundamentally, this is possible for two reasons. Firstly 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’ are different kinds of emergent properties…. 
Secondly, and fundamental to the workability of this explanatory 
methodology, ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ operate diachronically over 
different tracts of time because: (i) structure necessarily pre-dates the 
action(s) that transform it and (ii) structural elaboration necessarily 
post-dates those actions .. (2012, 52)       
This is key if we are to make sense of the structuring at time 1 which confronts black 
women (and other actors) with conditions not of their own choosing and upon which 
they reflexively act. It is clear from studies that the structuring conditions at time 1 are 
multiple and, moreover, if we are thinking in terms of both race and gender, that some 
areas are deeply resistant to change. We can identify a long durée in terms of 
reproduction with periods of morphostasis in relation to gender relations of power for 
example. The outcome is not preordained but our explanations as to why the outcome is 
change rather than stasis depend on looking at the structuring conditions and at 
individual and collective, or what Archer (2000) calls corporate, agency.  
 
Archer (1996) not only takes into account structural properties and emergence, but also 
takes culture seriously, introducing an analytically important distinction between 
Cultural System and the Socio-Cultural. The Cultural System refers to the existing 
intelligiblia: the ideas that can be expressed at any one time (whether these are actually 
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expressed or not). The logical relations between these elements within the system can 
be analysed through the formal features of the system namely those of contradiction, 
change, mutual reinforcement (complementarities), and reproduction. The Socio-
Cultural refers to how ideas map onto relationships between people – in other words, 
how ideas are taken up and mobilised. To simply reduce the former to the latter would 
be a form of epistemic fallacy since it reduces culture to our understanding of it. Socio-
Cultural elaboration at time 2-3 at the cultural level involves paying attention to both 
the System and the Socio-Cultural, which again can result in either morphogensis or 
morphostasis.   
 
Analytical dualism offers a valuable resource for thinking about intersections because it 
prises open the connections between structure and agency, and thus opens them up for 
explanatory accounts. Conflationary analysis is especially problematic in intersectional 
theorising where structures of oppression are seen as instantiated in the doing of race 
and gender and other forms of oppression. For example, West and Fenstermaker (1995) 
make valuable criticisms of mathematical metaphors in feminist theory, of which of 
course the intersection is one.  Their solution, however, is to propose an 
ethnomethodological approach in which ‘the ‘objective’ and ‘factual’ properties of 
social life attain such status through the situated conduct of societal members’ (1995, 
19). Effectively, different forms of oppression are analysed simultaneously by looking 
at how they are achieved through the ongoing activity of actors in the present. This is a 
form of central conflation, since neither structure not agency can be thought of 
independently of one another. What we have instead is continuous reproduction in 
present time. The historicity of emergence is lost in this account, and with it, the 
potential for explanatory analysis since structure is dissolved into repeated contextual 
enactments.   
 
This lack of analytical distinction also presents major problems for sustaining 
analytically useful categories such as women, since of course ‘woman’ is never 
instantiated in isolation from other social properties; hence, the charge of essentialism 
against early feminists who the used the term ‘women/woman’ in their accounts of 
women’s oppression.  However, in a carefully argued critical realist account 
Gunnarsson (2011)  defends the category of women pointing out that the starting point 
of feminist theory is to show how women are oppressed and exploited ‘by virtue of the 
fact of their being women’ (2011, 24).  Drawing on the work of Sayer (1992) she argues 
that abstract categories such as gender, race and class are essential for theorisation of 
structures of oppression that do not reduce to the level of the lived reality of individuals. 
When we use the term women we are referring to an abstraction as part of an 
explanatory account and crucially: 
critical realists apply a ‘causal criterion’ for ascribing a distinct reality to 
something …. If something has an impact on the world that is irreducible 
to the causal effects of other entities we can talk of it as a distinct reality,  
even though its reality is wholly premised on its relationship with other 
things (2015, 5). 
The critical realist account of explanation and the morphogenetic approach allow us to 
address the issue of separate but entangled processes in a way that does not lead to 
central conflation. This ability to hold structure and agency analytically separate is 
essential to address the multiple forms of oppression and exploitation that Crenshaw 
identified, since at the level of lived experience the concrete realities of race, class and 
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gender co-exist, but we need to be able to separate structure and agency to account for 
statis and change over time.   
 
Social theory needs to wrestle with understanding the multiple determinations of the 
concrete by employing necessary abstraction and accounting for the unseen. For this 
reason, critical realists utilise unifying non-deterministic categories as well as recognise 
the reality of mechanisms, not just events. In addition, the significance of historicity 
would be common ground for many intersectional theorists, although not necessarily 
under the terms considered above. Before further considering the potential explanatory 
power of morphogenetic analysis, however, I want to introduce Archer’s concept of 
agency, since this is highly distinctive and marks a break with poststructuralist theories 
of identity on which much intersectional analysis rests (Davis 2008).   
 
Agency  
 
Central to Archer’s (2000) theory of agency is the assertion of the primacy of practice 
rather than language, and her insistence that people have sui generis properties and 
powers which are not reducible to either those of structure or culture.  In doing so she 
breaks with the disembodied subject of ‘modernity’s man’: 
The metaphysics of modernity thus adduced a model of instrumentally 
rational man who could attain his ends in the world by pure logos, a 
rationality working through the formal manipulation of linguistic 
symbols to generate truth (2000, 23). 
Instead, in her book Being Human: the problem of agency, she elaborates a theory of the 
potentiality of active human agents whose properties and powers are emergent from our 
relations with the environment and with relative autonomy from both society and 
biology:  
The properties and powers of the human being are neither seen as 
pregiven, nor as socially appropriated, but rather these are emergent 
from our relations with our environment. As such they have relative 
autonomy from biology and society alike, and causal powers to 
modify both of them (2000, 87). 
 
By insisting on the importance of the embodied human being and the primacy of 
practice – Marx’s ‘continuous practical activity in a material world’ (2000, 122) – and 
as a species being with natural potentials, she develops a theory of the conditions for the 
emergence of the self in its necessary relations with the environment. In doing so she 
distinguishes between concepts of the self which are necessarily social, and a sense of 
the self which is not.  So that while there are discursively produced subjectivities, there 
is also an embodied sense of self continuous through the history of a particular life.  She 
argues that a coherent account of the development of agents and social actors needs to 
be grounded in this non-discursively formed continuous sense of self. This is a decisive 
break with the linguistic dominance found poststructuralist theorising and acts to ground 
her account of what it means to act in the world.  
 
Archer’s model of personal and social identity is one in which individual and collective 
agents have the resources to act creatively in the world, thus creating conditions for 
transformation and change as well as social stasis. She theorises the ways in which 
people come to be able to act reflexively through her notion of the ‘internal 
conversation’ which is essential to how humans come to make (always fallible) 
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judgements about the conditions in which they find themselves and deliberate about 
possible courses of action. She argues that human beings are fundamentally evaluative 
in their relations with reality, and that the ‘inner conversation’ is critical in 
understanding how human beings come to make commitments:   
The ‘inner conversation’ is how our personal emergent powers are 
exercised on and in the world – natural, practical and social – which 
is our triune environment. This ‘interior dialogue’ is not just a 
window on the world, rather it is what determines our being in the 
world, though not in times and circumstances of our choosing. 
Fundamentally, the ‘inner conversation’ is constitutive of our 
concrete singularity. However, it is also and necessarily a 
conversation about reality. This is because the triune world sets us 
three problems, none of which can be evaded, made as we are. It 
confronts us with three inescapable concerns: with our physical well-
being, our performative competence and our self worth (2003, 318).  
 
In keeping with her morphogenetic approach she elaborates how the ‘me’ in the present 
– ‘the conditioning me’ at time 1 – becomes at time 2 the conversational ‘I’, whereby 
possible future projects are reviewed for the ‘you’ at time 3. The ‘I’ reflexively 
monitors its ultimate concerns. Human beings in this account are strong evaluators with 
a range of personal powers who confront their triune environment and who perforce 
possess embodied knowledge, practical knowledge, and discursive knowledge.  
Reflexivity and the internal conversation are the means by which human beings can 
come to commit to their central concerns. Not all forms of reflexivity are the same and 
based on her empirical work she distinguishes between communicative, autonomous, 
meta, and fractured reflexivity (although historically and cross-culturally there may be 
more). Her work identifies ‘communicative reflexives’ who remain anchored in the 
natal social context of their birth families; ‘autonomous reflexives’ who adopt strategic 
stances towards constraints and become upwardly socially mobile; ‘meta-reflexives’ 
who are ‘contextually incongruous’ and ‘subversive towards social constraints and 
enablements, because of their willingness to pay the price of the former and to forfeit 
the benefits of the latter in the attempt to live out their idea’ ; and ‘fractured reflexivity’ 
where people are unable to form and act on their central projects or cares. Her view of 
humans includes an elaboration of the importance of both first and second order 
emotion. It is a misapprehension on the part of some feminists, for example, in Nelson’s 
(2003) contribution to a protracted debate about the value of critical realism for feminist 
economics, that critical realism excludes such matters (Clegg 2013).  
 
It is by virtue of these powers that humans come to reflexively define their central 
commitments through the internal conversation, which crucially forms the basis for 
corporate agency: 
Organised interest groups represent the generation of a new 
emergent property amongst people (a PEP), whose power is the very 
special punch they pack as far as systemic stability and change are 
concerned. Only those who are aware of what they want, can 
articulate it to themselves and others, and have organised in order to 
obtain it, can engage in concerted action to reshape or retain the 
structural and /or cultural features in question. These are termed 
‘Corporate Agents’: they include self-conscious vested interest 
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groups, promotive interest groups, social movements and defensive 
associations (2000, 265) 
I have argued elsewhere that Archer’s concepts give us a powerful basis for theorising 
agency in feminism and for breaking both with the unified subject of modernity and the 
poststructuralist problematic of dissolving the political subject of feminism (Clegg 
2006). While poststructuralist analysis has successfully documented aspects of unfixity 
and fragmentation in terms of social identity, it lacks the theoretical resource to explain 
the powerful sense of self which it ends up negating. This is because, despite the 
seeming openness in poststructuralism at the level of ontology offered by the and/and 
formulation, rather than either /or (Davies 1997, 2004) poststructuralism’s fundamental 
ontological claim involves the primacy of the discursive and denial of a pre-discursive 
self.  With these distinctions in mind, it is now possible to return to the central theme of 
this paper, namely, critical realism as a resource for theorising the multiple intersections 
to which intersectionality refers.   
  
Intersectional theory and critical realism  
 
I have argued elsewhere (Clegg 2006, 2012) that there is often much commonality at 
the level of concrete analysis between theorists from different traditions. While there is 
overlap in terms of substantive analysis, critical realism rejects the Nietzschean legacy 
of poststructuralism and the idea that that the individual subject is a fiction, that the will 
to power is constitutive of identity and reality, and that science itself has no special 
epistemological significance. Poststructuralism has offered intersectional theorists many 
useful methodological tools, but these are not the preserve of poststructural analysis. 
Attention to the significance of the discursive is not unique to poststructuralism and 
critical realism pays attention both to the discursive and the critical deconstruction of 
categories. In taking issue with specific pieces of research, it is often the ontological 
status of the claims being made that are being challenged and not the specific empirical 
arguments or the data presented.   
 
Intersectional theory, as we have seen, resonated powerfully because the substantive 
situations its analysis sought to address are of immense importance for sociological 
theory, and it seemed to successfully align competing strands of feminist theory. 
However, as indicated, the danger in intersectional analysis is that analytical 
distinctions between structure and agency, and between culture and agency, are elided; 
additionally, in simultaneously talking about both the experiences and the structures of 
oppression, the historicity of emergence is collapsed. This is particularly problematic 
where positions are argued which appear to be about structural and cultural forms of 
inequality (in critical realist terms: the operation of the SEPs and CEPs at time 1) but 
which are then reduced to the question of multiple identities. Yuval-Davis  (2006) gives  
a particularly apposite example of this kind of reasoning in the report of  the Working  
Group on Women and Human Rights where she shows how the report begins with 
structural concerns which ‘structure the relative positions of women, races, ethnicities, 
classes and the like’ (2006, 197) but is transmuted into a concern with specific 
identities. This slippage allows no space in which to consider how actors engage with 
structural conditions over time, reflexively engaging with the structural conditions at 
time 1 in order to commit to projects which may or may not result in morphogenesis. In 
this instance, the example is policy, in which the ability of people to come to 
evaluations and act upon their concerns is central. Therefore, the elaboration of 
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particular identities may or may not have salience in the formation of particular social 
movements or alliances (or in Archerian terms, the exercise of corporate agency).   
 
Thinking about historically sedimented structures of multiple oppressions presents a 
series of contexts which are suited to morphogenetic analysis at both the cultural and 
social level. A critical realist reading of Crenshaw’s GM example could be that 
constraints in the ideational cultural system at time one, implied by the legal separation 
of ‘race’ and ‘gender’, are elaborated and challenged at the socio-cultural level at time 
two as actors challenge this separation  by insisting on the specificity of their 
oppression  as ‘black women’ through attempts to seek remediation in court. Crenshaw 
identifies black women as previously unrecognised corporate actors; as such the ways 
their activities have led to changes in law and other institutions over time is clearly 
important. Equally important are questions regarding what has not changed, and the 
nature of structural constraints. The issue is not the elaboration of intersectional theory 
as a unitary set of propositions but of the specification of clear problems which can be 
analysed in ways which show how particular intersections operate over time. Historicity 
is, therefore, key to the argument.  
 
The challenge for critical realist analysis is to bring the analytical lens which it affords 
to existing work on intersectionality, with the aim of clarifying what the claims might 
be, and also to mobilise critical realism as a resource for nascent research projects that 
explore specific instances of how intersections are operating. From a critical realist 
perspective, there is an important role for research which looks at the operation of 
specific mechanisms in particular geohistorical locations: 
As long as we are clear that an analysis of for instance gender on its own 
terms relies on an abstraction of some processual parts from an infinitely 
complex social whole …, it is desirable that some theorists engage in 
‘separatist’ theoretical explorations of what precisely this ‘gender’ (or 
‘race’, ‘class’ ‘sexuality’) is, in certain geohistorical locations.  
Otherwise there is a risk that we reproduce unreflected notions of their 
ontologies (Gunnarsson 2015, 10) 
In other words, not all analysis undertaken form a critical realist perspective will be of  
intersections but the philosophical clarity underpinning the work will mean that the 
work is capable of contributing to the wider research programme. The work of  
identifying particular mechanisms is grounded in a general philosophical model of 
explanation in the social sciences, based on the twin ideas of ‘retroduction’ and 
‘retrodiction’ (Bhaskar 1986, 68).  Theoretical explanation is retroductive and involves 
identifying and analysing the causal powers, underlying mechanisms, and the entities 
that possess them. Retrodiction involves the analysis of concrete phenomena through 
the analysis of the multiple causal forces operating in the messy open systems of the 
social world.  Retrodiction is of particular significance for intersectional analysis 
because, as Mirza (2009) indicates, this involves charting how different forms of 
oppression create ‘specific and varied patterns of inequality’ (2009, 3), thereby using 
abstraction and knowledge of multiple mechanisms to reconstitute the concrete.  
 
As Davis
 
(2008) points out, the political aims influenced by the idea of multiple 
oppressions and poststructuralism appeared to share the common goal of deconstructing 
the unified concept of woman. But poststructuralism, at its extreme, deconstructs all 
sorts of difference including those which gave rise to the need to theorise 
intersectionality in the first place. The danger is that the structures and experiences 
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referred to by Crenshaw and Mirza are reduced to the merely discursive and to the 
fluidity of unfixed identities. However, this presents particular problems for sustaining 
the idea of agency in the critical realist sense, which is necessary in order to understand 
and theorise the collective mobilisation involved in political projects. This problem is 
produced within poststructuralism by a deconstruction of the subject such that agency 
and voice are reduced to subjectification, the on-going process of producing a ‘self’ 
which lacks ontological status.  
 
This is illustrated in the arguments of Davies (1997, 2004), where, following Foucault, 
she describes the unfixity of the subject as the ongoing process of the constitution of the 
‘self’. While she defines the subject as fictional (note the scare quotes around ‘self’), 
she nonetheless recognises the power of these fictions as central to the feminist project 
of bringing about change. So the central contradiction Davis (2008) identifies with 
movement activists is glossed over into a feminist subject discursively brought into 
being. What is important to note from a critical realist perspective is that, in this 
account, the powers accorded to PEPs disappear from view as a subject to be analysed 
at the empirical and philosophical level, while distinctions between epistemic and 
judgemental relativism are simply collapsed. 
 
In order to meaningfully address issues of identity, we need a proper theory of persons. 
This is central to the task of analysing experiences and identities from a critical realist 
perspective.  This would allow us to tease out people’s concerns in their relations with 
the natural, practical and social order, to consider how the causal powers of human 
beings come to be exercised, and how as strong evaluators people come to understand 
the salience of race and gender, for example, as key aspects (or not) of their personal 
and in some circumstances political identity.  This is not a simple or singular exercise 
and involves understanding how people come to deliberate on their circumstances and 
reflexively identify themselves (or not) as, say, a black woman. In relation to the 
emergence of new political subjects, critical realism would suggest that it is within the 
context of people’s emergent powers and the possibilities that the development of 
corporate agency can be understood.  
 
Furthermore, an analysis of social movements and the conditions under which they 
flourish is essential. In the exchange between Harding (1999, 2003) from a standpoint 
theorist perspective, and Lawson (1999, 2002), from a critical realist perspective, 
Harding makes important arguments about why powerful insights are produced by 
differently positioned groups of actors. Harding’s account of why feminists historically 
chose to struggle on the epistemological front is one such explanatory account, but that 
does not foreclose the ontological argument about the stratified nature of reality as 
emphasised by Lawson. In some of the writing on intersectionality corporate agency 
has been strategically deployed not to argue the case for sectional interests (specifically 
the interests of black women or women of colour) but to extend the case to developing a 
more universal set of claims about social justice. Hill Collins (2004) in her book Black 
Sexual Politics argues that she is dealing with a local manifestation of more general 
global phenomena and extends the commitment to social justice to all human beings. So 
the sorts of corporate agents she imagines are defined not only in terms of their personal 
characteristics, but by virtue of their values and commitments to social justice.  
 
These commitments are best analysed within a view of social science which is alive to 
human values and flourishing.  Concerns with social justice constitute a key element of 
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critical realist thinking.  An important part of critical realism’s Bhaskarian legacy is the 
connection between critical realism and concerns with human emancipation (Bhaskar 
1986). He argued that if we can identify the underlying mechanisms which are 
producing injustice or suffering, then we can show under what conditions it could be 
otherwise. In these circumstances, the argument becomes that ceritus paribis (other 
things being equal) we should change it. Sayer in his book Why Things Matter to 
People (2011) deconstructs and shows the inadequacy of the fact-value separation 
which has plagued much philosophy and social scientific thinking. This separation is 
closely related to the historically gendered separation between reason and emotion 
(Clegg 2013) and the denial of a relation between two. This dichotomisation and its 
detrimental consequences have been the target of much feminist scholarship (eg Boler 
1999) and Archer (2000) has argued that emotions are important for the personal 
commitments people make to the things that matter to them and are thus central in 
understanding human agency.  Sayer’s (2011) naturalistic grounding of claims about 
the conditions for human flourishing are important for the broader political projects 
articulated by Hill-Collins (2004) and others. They are not the only theorists to do so; 
critical realists share much common ground with other sorts of critical theory. 
Normative reasoning and conclusions are central to any political praxis as is the power 
of deconstruction, and I am not arguing that critical realists have the only claim to these 
traditions.  In Bodies That Matter Judith Butler, for example, argues that:    
To call a presupposition into question is not the same as doing away with 
it; rather, it is to free it from its metaphysical lodgings in order to 
understand what political interests were secured in and by that 
metaphysical placing, and thereby to permit the term to occupy and to 
serve very different political aims (1993, 30). 
Although she eschews an explanatory account of how these metaphysical lodgings came 
to exercise their hold, the emancipatory logic is clear. I am claiming, however, that 
radical politics, and this includes the motivating force behind all intersectional theory, is 
better served by analyses which can impute agency to actors. The tensions between 
poststructuralist accounts of selfhood as subjectification (Davies 1997, 2004)  and the 
aspirations of activists for a better world cannot be simply reduced to the charge of 
essentialism against the early women’s movement (although there are examples of this 
in speech and writing designed to mobilise). Nor is it to deny that many analyses of 
particular situations were inadequate because they failed to take account of the 
complexity of the ways structural features of race, class and other oppressions operate. 
Explanatory analysis is difficult and always incomplete. However, substantive analyses 
would be better if not hobbled by inadequate accounts of structure and agency, and the 
flat ontologies of both poststructuralism and empiricism.  
 
This is why a morphogenetic account is important: it neither reduces society to 
individual experience, nor experience to society. Furthermore, and most importantly, it 
does not conflate the two in an endless and amorphous present. Rather, it offers the 
analytical tools to analyse the historicity of emergence. All this means nothing, 
however, if our theory of persons is too thin to account for first, our capacity to act in 
the world and second, our reasons as strong evaluators, powered by first and second 
order emotions and reflexivity, for doing so (Archer 2000). Of course there are 
differences between critical realists in relation, for example, to the relative importance 
of habitual action and reflexivity and how to theorise these. No theory is or can be 
complete, but because I am not a judgemental relativist I think some theories are better 
than others. Critical realism both acts as an under-labourer for science and, as we have 
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seem in Archer’s case, offers substantive propositions about the nature of the internal 
conversation and situated reflexivity.  It brings both of these benefits to the analysis of 
intersectionality, enhancing the possibilities for its research programme. A philosophical 
approach which cannot adequately theorize human agency and the possibilities for 
corporate agency seems inadequate to the task of both analysis and politics.  By 
articulating agency and exploring historical emergence and the morphogenetic cycle, 
this work can ground radical normative aims. While Davis’s (2008) argument about the 
productivity of intersectionality as a research programme is sociologically insightful, a 
research programme underpinned by a philosophy that clearly explicates its relation to 
human practice has even more potential.  
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